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Note
Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe
Harbor Post-Momenta
Emily M. Wessels*
It is a familiar scene: a patient receives a prescription from
her physician and brings it to her local pharmacy. A pharmacist instinctively substitutes the prescribed brand-name drug
with one of the many generic options, each made by a different
1
pharmaceutical manufacturer. The interchange is so seamless
and familiar that consumers rarely give it a second thought. In
fact, currently about three-quarters of prescriptions are filled
2
with a generic drug.
Thirty years ago the scene would have been strikingly different. In 1983, generic drugs accounted for less than twenty
3
percent of prescriptions. But Congress’s enactment of the Drug

* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; Pharm. D.
2011, Drake University. Thank you to Professor Thomas F. Cotter for his continued insight and advice on this topic. I also owe many thanks to the exceptional board and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Danny Deveny and Robin Lehninger, who played an integral role in publishing
this Note. Heartfelt thanks go to my friends and family, most notably my parents, Richard and Beth Lentz, and my sister, Kristin, for their continuous encouragement. Finally, I thank my husband, Joe, for his enduring love and
support. Copyright © 2014 by Emily M. Wessels.
1. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 1 n.2 (2012), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf (“A brand-name drug is a drug
marketed under a proprietary, trademark-protected name.”); id. at 1
(“[G]eneric drugs . . . are copies of approved brand-name drugs.”).
2. See, e.g., id. at 2 (estimating that the generic utilization rate is “about
78 percent for drugs dispensed in retail settings”); Martha M. Rumore, The
Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.pharmacytimes.com/
publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic
-HatchWaxman-0809 (“[T]oday more than 70% of prescriptions are for generics . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 (placing the generic utilization rate at 19% in 1984); Rumore, supra note 2 (“[P]re–
Hatch-Waxman generic prescriptions numbered 15%.”).
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Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
5
marked a shift toward generic proliferation. The Act—also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman)—
introduced an abbreviated pathway for U.S. Food and Drug
6
Administration (FDA) approval of generic drugs. Reflecting
Congress’s desire to balance the interests of brand companies,
generic manufacturers, and the public, Hatch-Waxman also
contained a “safe harbor” provision shielding generic manufacturers from patent infringement liability for activities “reason7
ably related” to submitting information to the FDA. This provision was designed so that a generic can enter the market as
soon as—but not before—the patent on the brand medication
8
expires.
Notably, since its enactment the scope of the safe harbor
has progressively widened to apply to medical devices, research
tools, and even information that is ultimately never included in
9
an FDA submission. The Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision in
10
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC seemed to slow
this momentum toward an unbound interpretation of the safe
harbor. The Classen court appeared to draw a bright line strictly limiting the application of the safe harbor doctrine to activities occurring before the FDA approves a drug for commercial

4. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
5. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 (“Increased use of generic drugs can partly be attributed to the regulatory framework that was established in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).
6. Hatch-Waxman Act, §§ 101–106, 98 Stat. at 1585–97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Keysha Bryant,
Biosimilars: The Long and Winding Pathway to Approval, U.S. PHARMACIST:
GENERIC DRUG REV., June 21, 2013, http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/
253/c/41438/.
7. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2006)); see also B. Scott Eidson, Note, How Safe Is the Harbor?
Considering the Economic Implications of Patent Infringement in Section
271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1171–75 (2004) (discussing the enactment of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor).
8. See, e.g., Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 124–25 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief
Counsel, FDA) (explaining that in enacting Hatch-Waxman, “Congress sought
to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection and marketing exclusivity
for . . . new drugs has expired, consumers would benefit from the rapid availability of lower priced generic versions of innovator drugs”).
9. See infra Part I.D.1.
10. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
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11

sale. The respite, however, was short lived. In August 2012,
the Federal Circuit changed course in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., an infringement
suit between two manufacturers of enoxaparin, the generic ver12
sion of the complex drug Lovenox. The split Momenta panel
held that Amphastar’s post-approval use of Momenta’s patented method for analyzing an enoxaparin sample was protected
under the safe harbor because the FDA required the analysis
13
as a condition of the generic’s continued drug approval. Judge
Rader dissented, noting that the decision essentially rendered
the patent worthless by sanctioning unrestricted, indefinite
14
commercial infringement at the patentee’s expense.
Although the Momenta court attempted to reconcile its
holding with Classen, the two decisions’ treatments of the temporal scope of the safe harbor are arguably at odds. Satisfactory
resolution of this tension is needed to restore Hatch-Waxman’s
intended balance between brand and generic drug manufacturers. Momenta highlights the importance of timely resolution as
the pharmaceutical industry prepares to usher in a new age of
15
biopharmaceutical—or “biologic”—innovation. Similar to the
complex drug at issue in Momenta, large biologic molecules necessitate strict quality control analyses to demonstrate the
16
“sameness” required to qualify as a “follow-on” product (which

11. For commentary contemporaneous with Classen interpreting the decision as a bright-line limit, see, for example, Aaron F. Barkoff, Federal Circuit
Confines 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor to Pre-Approval Activities, ORANGE BOOK BLOG
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.orangebookblog.com/2011/08/federal-circuit
-confines-271e1-safe-harbor-to-pre-approval-activities.html; Gray Buccigross,
Safe-Harbor Provision of Hatch-Waxman Act Does Not Protect Post-Approval
Research Activities, FDA L. UPDATE (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog
.com/2011/10/articles/legislation/safe-harbor-provision-of-hatch-waxman-act
-does-not-protect-post-approval-research-activities/.
12. 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
13. Id. at 1357–59.
14. Id. at 1369–70 (Rader, J., dissenting).
15. See Ian Evans, Follow-on Biologics: A New Play for Big Pharma, 83
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 97, 99 (2010) (discussing the potential of biopharmaceuticals to reshape the face of medicine in light of a slowdown in traditional
small-molecule pharmaceutical innovation). For purposes of this Note, the text
refers to the terms biopharmaceutical and biologic interchangeably.
16. Compare Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1350–51 (explaining the complex requirements for determining “sameness” between enoxaparin and Lovenox due
to the drug’s molecular diversity), with FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE: QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PROTEIN
PRODUCT 9–15 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf (de-
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is comparable to the biologic equivalent of a generic ). If Momenta is allowed to stand for the unfettered proposition that
post-approval quality control processes are unenforceable
against infringers, the result could chill an entire field of intellectual property rights essential for the development of any sort
of meaningful follow-on biologic market.
This Note advocates for a statutory scheme that narrows
safe harbor protection for activities occurring after FDA approval and provides compensation to all affected patentees. The
proposed changes would restore the balance between easing the
barrier to competitors’ market entry and preserving the intellectual property rights of patent holders responsible for pharmaceutical innovation. It would also lay groundwork for the
growth of a successful follow-on biologic regime. To this end,
Part I provides a brief overview of the context, enactment, and
judicial evolution of the safe harbor doctrine. Part I also presents a summary of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Classen
and Momenta. Part II examines the safe harbor’s application as
a liability exception and extrapolates the likely consequences of
the Momenta decision to the field of biopharmaceuticals. Part
III concludes that the safe harbor should provide adequate recompense to patent holders, whether they are brand, generic, or
follow-on manufacturers. Keeping the interests of both private
and public stakeholders in mind, the proposed solution includes
enhanced procedures for notifying follow-on manufacturers of
potential infringement, as well as a reasonable royalty for all
patent owners subjected to the safe harbor and a period of
commercial exclusivity for those facing excused post-approval
infringement.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SAFE HARBOR DOCTRINE
The intersection of innovation, patent protection, and FDA
regulation creates challenges unique to the pharmaceutical
scribing the many different analytical factors involved in demonstrating similarity between a follow-on biologic and reference product).
17. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34045, FDA
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 1 & n.1 (2010), available at http://
primaryimmune.org/advocacy_center/pdfs/health_care_reform/Biosimilars_
Congressional_Research_Service_Report.pdf (explaining that “[a] follow-on
biologic is similar but not identical to the brand-name . . . product,” and that
although sometimes referred to “as biogenerics or generic biologics[, t]he FDA
and many others consider the use of the word generic to be inaccurate because
the term has been used, in the context of chemical drugs, to mean identical”);
see also id. at 9–12 (discussing the unique scientific challenges associated with
comparing follow-on biologics with the brand-name drugs).
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field. This Part introduces the nuanced development of the law
in these areas that resulted in the enactment of the safe harbor
doctrine. It continues with an explanation the doctrine’s expansion and finishes with a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Classen and Momenta.
A. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The U.S. pharmaceutical market is a multi-billion dollar
18
industry with $330 billion in sales in 2012. The market tradi19
tionally has been dominated by small molecule drugs, which
are chemicals with a “well-defined structure [that] can be thor20
oughly characterized.” Unfortunately, innovation of truly novel small molecule pharmaceuticals has arguably slowed in re21
cent years. Instead, companies have concentrated resources
22
on producing imitation “me-too” products. These drugs tend to
target saturated markets and generally offer few advantages in
23
terms of therapeutic benefits or favorable side effect profiles.
Recent developments in biopharmaceuticals, however, rep24
resent a possible return to significant innovation. Biologics
18. Worldwide Pharmaceutical Sales by Region 2010–2012, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/world-pharmaceutical-sales-by
-region/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
19. See Biotech Products in Big Pharma Clinical Pipelines Have Grown
Dramatically, TUFTS CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_ir_nov_dec_2013 (noting the “historical
concentration on small molecule drugs”).
20. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/%20HowDrugs
areDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologic
Applications/ucm113522.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research
and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money?, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 7,
2012, at 22, 23 (“This is the real innovation crisis: pharmaceutical research
and development turns out mostly minor variations on existing drugs . . . .”).
22. See AIDAN HOLLIS, ME-TOO DRUGS: IS THERE A PROBLEM? 1 (2004),
available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_
Hollis1.pdf (noting the increased “criticism on the drug industry for the increasing extent to which investment appears to be focused on developing drugs
which have a similar mechanism of action to pre-existing drugs”).
23. Id. at 1 (acknowledging the varying definitions of a me-too drug while
defining it as “one that is approved after a pioneering drug and which is [comparable or similar] . . . and is not clinically superior”).
24. ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.biocity.co.uk/file-manager/Group/
reports2007/2007-beyondborders.pdf (“There is no question that biotechnology
is now the engine of innovation for the drug development industry.”); Michael
Pohlscheidt & Robert Kiss, Recent Advances and Trends in the Biotechnology
Industry—Development and Manufacturing of Recombinant Proteins and An-
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are complex molecules produced from living organisms. Biologics are generally on the cutting edge of treatment, offering
26
new therapeutic options for previously untreatable diseases.
It is projected that by 2015, biologics will account for $167 bil27
lion of U.S. pharmaceutical sales.
The shift from small molecule drugs to biologics underscores a key public policy consideration: the need to balance innovation of new treatments with affordable access to these life28
saving therapies. The recent skyrocketing of health care costs
29
highlights the importance of this balancing act. On the one
hand, experts estimate that bringing a new small-molecule
therapy to market may cost as much as $1.3 billion in research
30
and development (R&D). On the other, brand-name drugs can
31
cost consumers hundreds of dollars.
tibodies, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV., Sept./Oct. 2013, http://www
.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/Featured-Articles/148856-Recent
-Advances-and-Trends-in-the-Biotechnology-Industry-Development-and
-Manufacturing-of-Recombinant-Proteins-and-Antibodies/ (“A large number of
[biologics] have been approved, delivering meaningful contributions to patients’ lives, and are anticipated to be the major growth driver for the industry
in the upcoming years.”).
25. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products,
supra note 20.
26. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda
.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/
ucm133077.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).
27. Bhupinder Singh Sekhon & Vikrant Saluja, Biosimilars: An Overview,
BIOSIMILARS, Mar. 14, 2011, at 1, 1.
28. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS INDUSTRY: A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 1 (2008),
available at http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/
Kotlikoff_Innovation_in_Biologics21.pdf (“The key issue in providing affordable access to biologic wonder drugs is doing so without limiting their development.”).
29. The Skyrocketing Cost of U.S. Health Care: By the Numbers, THE
WEEK, Mar. 30, 2012, http://theweek.com/article/index/226276/the
-skyrocketing-cost-of-us-health-care-by-the-numbers.
30. Compare Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (calculating the cost of drug development as $802 million), and Joseph A. DiMasi &
Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 476 (2007) (using a timeadjusted drug development cost of $1.318 billion), with Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 34, 46 (2011) (critiquing DiMasi et al. and placing
the cost of drug development at a median of $43.4 million). But see Tufts
CSDD’s Official Response to the Recent Light & Warburton Commentary,
TUFTS CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Mar. 2011), http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/
complete_story/internal_news (responding to Light & Warburton’s critique in
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The R&D costs are just as high, if not higher, for biolog32
ics. Biologics also take longer to develop and have a lower suc33
cess rate than small-molecule drugs. These consequences
34
stem from the complexity of biologic molecules. Because biologics are derivatives of living organisms, even small manufacturing differences can cause significant variations in the end
35
product. The increased development costs are then passed on
36
to consumers. To illustrate, the yearly cost of biologic therapy
averages $16,425, compared to $730 for traditional pharmaceu37
ticals.
Fortunately, market competition can help control consum38
ers’ costs. The proliferation of generics demonstrates the beneficial effects of competition. Since generic small molecule drugs
have become widely available, these products have been substituted for brand-name drugs at an average cost savings of sev39
enty-five percent. It is further estimated that a successful
biosimilars market could produce savings of up to forty persupport of DiMasi et al.).
31. See, e.g., Ganesan Marimuthu et al., Maintaining Patents Protecting
Biologics or Small-Molecule Drugs, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 50, 50 (2012);
Linda A. Johnson, Drug Prices to Plummet in Wave of Expiring Patents,
NBCNEWS.COM (July 25, 2011, 1:44:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
43882446/ns/health-health_care/t/drug-prices-plummet-wave-expiring-patents/
#.Us3j87Q0wqc.
32. See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 30, at 475–76 (recognizing that
overall figures for biologic development may be higher than traditional pharmaceuticals depending on the accuracy of time-adjusted calculations).
33. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R 41483, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: THE LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41483.pdf
[hereinafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES].
34. See ANDREW F. BOURGOIN, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC MARKET IN THE U.S.: IMPLICATIONS, STRATEGIES, AND
IMPACT 1 (2011), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/science/
pdf/ls/newport-biologics.pdf (“[M]any [biologics] demand substantial investment to manufacture due to the product complexity.”).
35. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33,
at 15.
36. BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 (“The high development cost of biologic
products is often reflected in their price.”).
37. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO WITH KARAN SINGH & MEGHA MUKIM, THE POTENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE
ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 4 (2008), available at http://www.sonecon.com/
docs/studies/0208_GenericBiologicsStudy.pdf.
38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The
competition that brand-name drugs face from generic equivalents is associated
with lower overall drug prices . . . .”).
39. Id.
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40

cent, demonstrating the importance of fostering competition
as the biopharmaceutical field continues to grow.
B. U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
Faced with such high R&D costs, the patent system offers
pharmaceutical companies an opportunity to recover some of
those costs. A patent allows its holder to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention for a defined
41
period of time. The U.S. system of exclusivity is grounded in
an economic/utilitarian philosophy, providing the economic reward of a limited monopoly as an incentive for conferring the
“ultimate benefit to the public” through technological advance42
ment and increased institutional knowledge. The economic
reward of exclusivity not only offers the patentee a chance to
recoup its investment by singularly exploiting the technology,
but the patentee may ultimately realize profits above and be43
yond the cost of innovation. Alternatively, the patent owner
may license the invention for use by others, which generally involves a reasonable royalty or other form of compensation to
44
the patentee. It is this potential for significant return on in45
vestment that is a key driver of pharmaceutical innovation.
Unrestrained exclusivity, however, undercuts the utilitari46
an underpinnings of the patent system. It leads to overprotection and limits access to information, decreasing the net benefit
47
to society. U.S. patent law, therefore, does not grant unfettered exclusivity. Rather, certain liability exceptions exist for
40. BOURGOIN, supra note 34 (“At the individual product level, reports are
estimating that biosimilars may cost between 60 and 80 percent of the reference biologic therapy upon market entry.”).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); see also id. §§ 101–03 (specifying that an
inventive process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that meets
three basic requirements—namely utility, novelty, and nonobviousness—may
be eligible for patent protection).
42. See Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 351, 358–59 (2005); see also Maureen O’Rourke, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1182 (2000) (“In the absence of some mechanism to allow the originator
to at least recoup his or her investment, information will be under-produced.”).
43. See Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects
on the Conflict Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711, 715–16 (2003).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (describing the right to a reasonable royalty).
45. See Gillat, supra note 43.
46. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1183.
47. Id. at 1183 n.16.
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situations where society has determined that the benefits of ac48
cess to the invention outweigh the costs to the patent holder.
These liability exceptions limit the patent owner’s exclusive
49
right to use or license the patented invention. In the interest
of maintaining the balance between the economic and utilitarian underpinnings of the U.S. patent system, such exceptions
50
are granted sparingly.
C. FDA REGULATION
Simply having a patent, however, does not give a pharma51
ceutical company an affirmative right to sell its product. A
manufacturer must have an FDA-approved application before it
52
can bring a drug to market. The scope of information required
in the initial application makes the approval process expensive
53
and time consuming, adding to the costs of R&D. The FDA
can also condition continued approval on the collection of post54
approval safety and efficacy data.
The approval process itself has evolved over time. In most
circumstances, a company wanting to market a new, or “pioneer,” drug must file a New Drug Application (NDA) demon55
strating the drug is safe and effective. Historically, another
company wanting to sell its generic version of that drug also
56
had to file its own NDA. Unfortunately, this system produced
48. Gillat, supra note 43, at 713–14.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 714 (describing the exceptions to patent exclusivity as “narrow
and specific”).
51. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R
41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 1 (2012), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
R41114_03132013.pdf.
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (mandating FDA approval of “new drugs”
and describing the application requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (requiring the licensure of biologics).
53. ALAN MINSK ET AL., FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., THE 505(b)(2) NEW
DRUG APPLICATION PROCESS: THE ESSENTIAL PRIMER ii (2010), available at
http://www.fdli.org/resources/resources-order-box-detail-view/the-505%28b%
29%282%29-new-drug-application-process-the-essential-primer (describing the
studies required by the FDA as the “most time-consuming and expensive part
of the drug development process”).
54. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.165 (2013).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
56. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 20 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland
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some unintended consequences. The NDA process could tie up
years of patent exclusivity for the pioneer drug before the drug
57
could enter the market. At the same time, later companies
had to invest millions of dollars to produce the same safety and
58
efficacy data provided by the pioneer company. Furthermore,
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co. prevented generic manufacturers from
conducting tests with the pioneer drug until the patent ex59
pired. This essentially granted the pioneer manufacturer a de
facto extension of its monopoly during the time it took the ge60
neric company to perform the required studies. Delayed generic entry decreased market competition, keeping drug prices
61
high.
Congress responded to these unintended consequences by
enacting Hatch-Waxman. Addressing the first issue, HatchWaxman included limited patent term extensions to offset the
62
delays associated with FDA approval. Regarding the second
concern, Hatch-Waxman introduced an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) pathway to eliminate the duplicity associated with requiring an NDA for subsequent versions of ap63
proved drugs. Rather than requiring independent safety and
efficacy data, an ANDA allows a generic manufacturer to designate an already-approved product as a “reference” product
and rely on the data included in the reference product’s NDA to
.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/rl3075601102005.pdf
[hereinafter
SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION].
57. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (noting that it could take up to ten years for a drug to be approved
after the NDA was submitted to the FDA), superseded by statute, HatchWaxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585, as recognized in
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003) (“[T]he 1962
Amendments [to the FDA drug approval process] resulted in a significant erosion of the term of exclusivity provided to pharmaceutical manufacturers under the patent laws.”).
58. See Roche, 733 F.2d at 860 (describing federally mandated premarketing tests); SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 20 (noting
characterization of the requirement that generic manufacturers independently
prove safety and effectiveness as “needlessly costly, duplicative and timeconsuming”); cf. supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the high
costs of drug development).
59. Roche, 733 F.2d at 861.
60. See Freeburg, supra note 42, at 366.
61. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590.
62. Id. at 590–91.
63. Id. at 593–94.
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64

meet the FDA’s approval criteria. The generic manufacturer
need only demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent to the
65
reference product. Finally, Hatch-Waxman created a process
for resolving patent disputes before the generic is approved for
66
market entry. The Act made it “an act of infringement to
submit [an ANDA] . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use
67
of which is claimed in a patent” and detailed a procedure for
68
challenging those patents.
The ANDA process itself, however, did not remedy the de
facto patent extension ratified by the court in Roche. A generic
manufacturer still could not commence the required bioequivalence studies until the patents on the reference product ex69
pired. Congress thus included a safe harbor provision in
Hatch-Waxman to address this problem, essentially overturn70
ing Roche. This provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
71
drugs . . . .

The theory behind the safe harbor was that a generic manufacturer could complete the necessary bioequivalence studies
72
and receive approval of its ANDA during the life of the patent.
But the generic manufacturer could not sell its product so long
as the product or its use was covered by a patent, preserving
the patent owner’s right to commercial exclusivity during the
patent term by preventing the generic from entering the mar73
ket until the patent expired.
64. Id. at 594–95.
65. Id.; see also Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www
.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100
.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013) (describing bioequivalence as “identical . . .
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance
characteristics and intended use”).
66. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.
67. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006)).
68. See id. §§ 201–202, 98 Stat. at 1598–1603; Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595–603.
69. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 605.
70. Id.; see Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
72. SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 25.
73. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) [hereinafter Committee Re-
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Notably, Hatch-Waxman’s patent dispute resolution procedures and ANDA provisions were implemented as amendments
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the statute that regulates
74
small-molecule drugs. Most biologics, on the other hand, are
75
regulated under the Public Health Services Act. As a consequence, neither the patent term extension nor the ANDA process introduced by Hatch-Waxman generally applies to biolog76
ics. Some portions of Hatch-Waxman, however, amended
77
statutes outside the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The safe
harbor was one of these broader provisions and was incorpo78
rated as a general amendment to the Patent Act. As a result,
79
the safe harbor is considered applicable to biologics.
Because biologics were excluded from the ANDA provisions
of Hatch-Waxman, until recently no procedure existed for ex80
pedited approval of follow-on biologics. Previously, a company
wanting to market its version of an approved biologic had to follow the same approval pathway as the pioneer and file its own

port] (“[Section 271(e)(1)] does not permit the commercial sale of a patented
drug . . . .”); id. at pt. 2, at 30 (“In this case the generic manufacturer is not
permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the patent . . . .”); see
also Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286,
and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 926 (1984) [hereinafter
Hearing] (memorandum of Alfred B. Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association) (agreeing on behalf of the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association that the safe harbor “does not authorize
any activity which would deprive the patent owner of the sale of a single tablet
during the life of a valid patent”).
74. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33901, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION
ISSUES 13 (2009), available at https://opencrs.com/document/RL33901/ [hereinafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES].
75. Id. at 3; Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological
Products, supra note 20.
76. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 74, at 13 (“To
the extent that a particular biologic is approved under the auspices of the PHS
Act, however, these provisions would be inapplicable.”). But see id. at 6 (“Because the definition of ‘drugs’ under the FDC Act is broad, however, the FDA
states that ‘[b]iological products subject to the PHS Act also meet the definition of drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological
Products, supra note 20)).
77. See id. at 13.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Jeanne Yang, Note, A Pathway to Follow-On Biologics, 3
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 217, 218 (2011).
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81

Biologic License Application (BLA). Needless to say, the system suffered from the same wasted resources problem that
plagued the small-molecule approval process prior to Hatch82
Waxman. Expedited approval of follow-on biologics, however,
presented its own unique challenges. First, developing a followon biologic is generally much more costly than developing a ge83
neric small-molecule drug. Second, the complexity of biologic
molecules can make it extremely difficult to demonstrate the
84
“sameness” required to establish bioequivalence.
Nevertheless, Congress turned its attention to establishing
an abbreviated approval mechanism for biosimilars in the Bio85
logics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA).
The BPCIA allows a company to designate an approved biologic
as a reference product and file an Abbreviated Biologic License
86
Application for approval of its follow-on product. The Act divides these follow-on products into two categories: biosimilars
87
and interchangeable biologics. To be biosimilar, the biologic
must be “highly similar” to the reference product with no clini88
cally meaningful differences in safety, purity, or potency. An
interchangeable biologic is a biosimilar “expected to produce
the same clinical result as the reference product” such that
switching between the two products presents no more risk to
the patient than repeat administration with the reference
89
product. An interchangeable can be freely substituted for the
81. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006); Biologics License Applications
(BLA) Process (CBER), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/ (last
updated Feb. 13, 2010).
82. See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 80, at 219; Andrew Jack, Pharmaceuticals:
Biosimilar Drugs Show the Copycats Keeping Up with Creators, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
FTFT000020131017e9ah0000h; Denise Myshko, What’s Ahead for Biosimilars,
PHARMAVOICE (Feb. 2012), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/
Corporate/Press%20Room/IMS%20in%20the%20News/Documents/
PharmaVOICE0212-IMS-Biosimilars.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Sekhon & Saluja, supra note 27, at 2–3; Yang, supra note 80,
at 230.
85. Though introduced separately in 2009, the BPCIA was ultimately incorporated into the Affordable Care Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010).
86. See id. § 7002(a)–(b), 124 Stat. at 804–15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262
(2006)).
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
89. Id. § 262(k)(4).

Wessels_MLR

1578

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1565

90

reference product. The first approved interchangeable biologic
for each reference product is granted a period of market exclusivity, the length of which varies depending on its commercial
91
and litigation status.
The statute also provides a mechanism for identifying and
92
resolving patent disputes. The BPCIA system differs from the
Hatch-Waxman process, accounting for the fact that small differences in manufacturing can significantly impact the end
product and recognizing that novel, complex processes may be
necessary to establish the high degree of similarity required for
93
classification as a biosimilar. Unlike Hatch-Waxman’s focus
on patented compounds and their methods of use, the BPCIA
framework also facilitates challenges to patents on the “method
94
of making” a drug. The ability to challenge these types of patents reflects the increased importance of manufacturing and
95
quality control patents in the biologic industry.
D. EXPANSION OF THE SAFE HARBOR

96

While its statutory language has remained relatively unchanged since 1984, the reach of the safe harbor has not re90. Id. § 262(i)(3).
91. Id. § 262(k)(6).
92. Id. § 262(l).
93. See Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (A Lack of) Science: Limitations in
Determining Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to
Their Approval and Commercialization, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, ¶¶ 5, 30,
42–46.
94. Id. ¶ 30 (“Another important difference between the ANDA and [follow-on biologic] approval pathways is that under [Hatch-Waxman], method-ofproduction (or process) patents cannot be asserted. In contrast, the BPCIA allows infringement actions against an entity ‘making’ the allegedly infringing
product, so method-of-production patents can be asserted against [follow-on
biologic] sponsors.”). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (“The [NDA] applicant shall [include] . . . any patent which claims the drug . . . or which claims a
method of using such drug . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)–(3) (2006) (requiring the follow-on applicant to provide the reference product sponsor with a
copy of its application and “such other information that describes the process
or processes used to manufacture the biological product” and allowing the
product sponsor to list all patents potentially infringed based on that information).
95. See Woodage, supra note 93 (discussing the challenges facing follow-on
manufacturers caused by the scientific and regulatory differences between biologics and small molecule drugs); see also infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
96. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, this section presents a
representative selection of cases interpreting the safe harbor in the years since
its enactment.
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mained static. Rather, important questions about the proper
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have led to judicial decisions significantly enlarging its protections in the intervening decades
97
since its enactment. More recently, two Federal Circuit decisions have focused renewed attention on the question of the
safe harbor’s scope.
1. Previous Judicial Developments
Reflecting a generally liberal approach to the safe harbor,
courts have endorsed a broad interpretation of § 271(e)(1)’s
98
text. In one of the first landmark safe harbor decisions, the
Supreme Court extended the safe harbor beyond its statutory
“drug” language and declared that § 271(e)(1) applies to medi99
cal devices as well. Courts have also interpreted the word
“solely” such that safe harbor protection can exist even if submission requirements under federal law are not the only, or
even the primary, motivating factor behind the infringing ac100
The Supreme Court has further construed the term
tion.
“solely” to support its conclusion that the safe harbor does not
categorically deny protection to activities that ultimately do not
101
result in a submission to the FDA.
2. Recent Federal Circuit Interpretations
More recently, the Federal Circuit issued two critical decisions interpreting the scope of the safe harbor. First was
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC in August

97. See Eidson, supra note 7, at 1180.
98. See, e.g., Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d
1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
1269, 1279–80 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
99. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (reasoning
that safe harbor protection applies to medical devices because even though
they were not specifically included in the statutory text, they are subject to
lengthy FDA regulatory approval processes similar to the drug approval process that motivated the enactment of Hatch-Waxman).
100. See, e.g., Telectronics, 982 F.2d 1520 (“Federal Circuit precedents indicate that . . . ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude application
of the section 271(e)(1) exemption.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107–08 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron
Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
101. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005)
(“[T]he use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under
§ 271(e)(1) as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce ‘the types of information that are relevant to a [new drug
application].’”).
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102

2011. The Classen plaintiff sued several biotech companies
for infringing its various patents on methods for evaluating and
103
improving immunization schedules. The allegedly infringing
activities involved evaluating vaccination schedules of already104
approved vaccines. The defendants argued that these activities were protected under the safe harbor doctrine because they
were “reasonably related” to regulations that required vaccine
manufacturers to review and report adverse reactions to the
105
FDA.
A split panel—with Judge Moore dissenting—rejected the
defendants’ argument, holding that the safe harbor “does not
apply to information that may be routinely reported to the
106
FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.” The
court continued to conclude that the defendants’ activities were
not immune because they were “not related to producing information for a [new drug application], and [were] not a ‘phase of
107
Legal
research’ possibly leading to marketing approval.”
commentary interpreted this decision as endorsing a strict pre108
approval limitation on the safe harbor’s scope.
Then, in August 2012, the Federal Circuit issued a seemingly conflicting decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
109
Momenta involved a suit beAmphastar Pharmaceuticals.
tween two generic manufacturers over a patented method for
110
analyzing samples of the complex drug enoxaparin. Because
of the molecular diversity of enoxaparin, the FDA had prescribed five criteria generic companies would need to satisfy to
establish bioequivalence for purposes of an ANDA, including
111
analysis of the molecular identity of the drug. The FDA fur102. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
103. Id. at 1060; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 454 (D. Md.
2005).
104. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
105. Id.; Classen, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
106. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
107. Id. at 1072.
108. See, e.g., Barkoff, supra note 11; Buccigross, supra note 11; see also
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Classen] parties and the amici certainly thought Classen turned on a pre-/post-approval distinction.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
109. 686 F.3d 1348.
110. Id. at 1349.
111. Id. at 1350.
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ther specified that continued analysis of each batch of drug was
112
required to maintain marketing approval. The patent-in-suit,
directed to satisfying these requirements, was assigned to Mo113
menta, which claimed that Amphastar infringed the patent
“by ‘manufacturing generic enoxaparin for commercial sale’ us114
ing the claimed methods” to test “each commercial batch of
115
enoxaparin [to] be sold after FDA approval.”
Focusing on the statutory language, Judge Moore’s majority opinion rejected Momenta’s argument that Classen had decisively limited safe harbor protection to pre-approval activi116
ties. The court determined that Amphastar’s post-approval
uses of the patented method fell squarely under the safe harbor
because “the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspection satisfie[d] the requirement that the uses be reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the
117
FDA.” The court distinguished Classen on the grounds that
the specific studies performed in that case were not mandated
118
by the FDA. The court further declined to condition its extension of the safe harbor to post-approval activities on the absence of non-infringing alternatives, allowing competitors “the
freedom to use an otherwise patented means to develop the
necessary information” even when non-infringing methods ex119
ist.
112. Id. at 1352 (“FDA requires a generic manufacture to include in its
manufacturing process the analysis of each batch of its enoxaparin drug substance to confirm that . . . [it] includes a 1, 6-anhydro ring structure.” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from FDA to Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(July 23, 2010))).
113. Id. at 1351.
114. Id. at 1352.
115. Id. at 1353.
116. Id. at 1353, 1358–60.
117. Id. at 1357.
118. Id. at 1358 (“This case, however, fits well within Classen because the
information submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the
ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug. . . . The submissions to
the FDA in this case are anything but ‘routine’—they implicate Amphastar’s
very ability to continue its FDA approval for its ANDA and to continue manufacturing and marketing enoxaparin under its ANDA. We also note that, unlike in Classen where the patented studies performed were not mandated by
the FDA, the information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but is generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated
under penalty of law to follow. Under such circumstances, the information can
be said to have been gathered solely for submission to the FDA and not, as in
Classen, primarily for non-FDA purposes.”).
119. Id. at 1359 (“This makes good sense because it . . . . avoids the situation here, where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from
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Judge Rader issued a strongly worded dissent, critiquing
the majority’s purported failure to adequately consider the
purpose of the statute in light of the “not plainly comprehensi120
Citing extensively to the legislative history of
ble” text.
Hatch-Waxman, Judge Rader maintained that Congress clearly
intended the safe harbor to be limited to pre-approval activities
121
in order to balance competition and innovation. He emphasized that the majority’s contrary interpretation endorsed “continuous, commercial infringing sales during any portion of the
122
life of the patent.” Judge Rader also took issue with the majority’s construction of the word “submission” to mean the required retention of records that may or may not be inspected by
123
the FDA and its acceptance that the statutory requirement
that infringement be “solely for uses reasonably related” to the
development of required data could be satisfied by uses “pri124
marily for production of a commercial product.” In conclusion,
Judge Rader foreshadowed that the majority’s extension of the
safe harbor would “essentially render manufacturing method
125
patents worthless.”
II. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE SAFE
HARBOR
Momenta is a landmark decision as the first extension of
safe harbor protection to activities that occur after FDA ap126
proval. Its practical consequences for the patentee—as highlighted by Judge Rader—also demonstrate that the safe harbor
presents an outdated model for an evolving pharmaceutical industry that places increased emphasis on manufacturing meth127
This Part explores why biologics and other complex
ods.
the market based on an FDA mandated testing requirement.”).
120. Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1366.
123. Id. at 1367 (“This new interpretation would allow almost all activity
by pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’ and therefore justify a
free license to trespass.”).
124. Id. at 1374.
125. Id. at 1369.
126. See, e.g., Isabelle Blundell, Safe Harbor Protects Post-Approval Activities, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at 11, 11,
available at http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/safe-harbor-protects-post
-approval-activities/4518/.
127. See Terry G. Mahn & Dr. Erin L. Baker, Is the Safe Harbor Too Safe
for Certain Biologic Patents?, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Aug.
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drugs do not fit neatly into the current framework of the safe
harbor. It reaches the conclusion that neither limiting the safe
harbor to pre-approval experimentation nor expanding protection to all post-approval activities would adequately promote
Hatch-Waxman’s intended balance between innovation and access in today’s pharmaceutical landscape.
A. THE SAFE HARBOR AS A LIABILITY EXCEPTION
Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor operates as one of the few
128
liability exceptions granted under U.S. patent law. It excuses
certain, otherwise infringing practices encompassed by the
statutory language and terminates the patent owner’s right to
129
exclude with respect to those practices. In order to best evaluate the practical implications of applying the current safe
harbor exemption to the field of biologics, one must first examine the underlying policy considerations of imposing a liability
exception.
1. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Patentees’ Rights
Liability exceptions arise out of a desire to excuse certain
130
infringing activities. Several existing exceptions in U.S. patent law, including the safe harbor, reflect a “public benefit”
theory—a desire to “allow socially beneficial uses that generate
131
large positive externalities.” Under this theory, exceptions
are justified when the net public benefit outweighs the intru132
sion on the private rights granted to the patent holder.
The existence and scope of an exception based in public
benefit theory therefore represents a balancing of stakeholder
interests between the patentee and the public. Specifically, the
16, 2013), http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/is-the-safe-harbor-too
-safe-for-certain-biologic-patents/5396/ (“The implications of Momemta [sic]
are particularly significant for biologic manufacturers who are required to
maintain and provide to FDA, batch-by-batch data on drugs being offered for
commercial sale.”); supra notes 93–95, 122, 125 and accompanying text.
128. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1197–98; see also supra notes 46–50
and accompanying text (discussing liability exceptions in U.S. patent law).
129. See, e.g., Patcharin Pisut, Freedom to Research: Room for Trial and
Error in Drug Development After Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 339, 339.
130. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1181; supra text accompanying note
48.
131. Id. at 1197–98 (listing examples of “situations in which the public
benefit from the infringement may be so great that it outweighs the patentee’s
interest in its exclusive rights”).
132. Id.
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greater the benefit and the smaller the intrusion, the more jus133
tified the exception—and vice versa. Due to the substantial
intrusion on the patentee’s rights, infringement that furthers
direct commercial competition weighs significantly against
134
granting an exception for such activities.
2. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Impact on Innovation
In addition to the individual costs to the patentee, social
costs imposed by a disincentive to innovate can decrease the
135
net public benefit. Patent exclusivity not only offers an opportunity to recover costs associated with invention, but it also includes the lure of a substantial return on investment if an in136
vention is successful. These potential revenues are often a
137
strong driver behind innovation. If these exclusivity incentives are removed—not only limiting the opportunity to recoup
costs but increasing the risk of loss—the motive to invent can
138
often disappear with them. Thus while the public may benefit
from a liability exception through increased access to a particular invention, any corresponding slowdown in innovation and
advancement caused by the exception detracts from its overall
139
net benefit.
Several factors influence the scope and likelihood of a po133. See O’Rourke, supra 42, at 1189 (using copyright law to explain the
doctrine of positive externalities for later discussion within the context of patent law). The importance of minimizing intrusion on the patentee’s rights is
echoed in the international arena. See id. at 1201 (“[Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
134. See id. at 1204–05 (noting a lack of authority “support[ing] excusing
commercial infringement that occurs in the marketing of a directly infringing
product”).
135. See, e.g., WILLIAM JACK, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 180 (1999); O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1182–83 (describing the underproduction of information associated with the public goods
problem).
136. See Gillat, supra note 43, at 715–16 (“It has been proposed that innovation is stimulated not merely by the potential of recouping the costs of R&D
and capturing profits. Rather, it is stimulated also by the skew of the reward
distribution; in other words, by the odds—however small—of hitting the ‘jackpot’ and to be one of the small minority of inventions that collect spectacular
profits.”).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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tential slowing in innovation caused by limiting a patent hold140
er’s right to exclusivity. These factors include the market significance of competing activities, the predictability of losing patent exclusivity, and the availability of alternative means for
141
recouping costs and reaping profits. Notably, these factors
present unique considerations in the context of pharmaceutical
innovation, which is particularly sensitive to the financial in142
centives of the patent system.
a. Market Significance
A first—and arguably most substantial—factor presaging
143
an undesirable effect on innovation is market significance. In
this context, market significance depends on the degree of competition between the patent holder and the entity practicing the
144
unauthorized use. It also correlates with the expected market
145
harm to the patentee. Direct competition between an unauthorized user and an established product or service of the pa146
tentee has high market significance. Market significance is
lower, however, if the unauthorized use involves an untested
147
product or the parties operate in different markets. The lower
the market significance, the less likely the unauthorized use
148
will negatively impact the patent holder’s potential profits.
The smaller the potential impact on the patentee’s return on
investment, the less likely financial considerations will deter
149
innovation. On the other hand, the higher the market significance and risk of financial injury is, the greater the patentee’s
150
disincentive to innovate.
140. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation:
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 873 (2003) (using a compulsory licensing format to
explore factors affecting pharmaceutical companies’ incentive to innovate);
Gillat, supra note 43, at 716 (“[I]nnovation is highly responsive to economic
stimuli. Incentives to innovate depend on[, among other things,] . . . the rate
and ease at which competitive imitation of the innovation occurs.”).
141. See infra Part II.A.2(a)–(c).
142. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 98–99 (2000).
143. Chien, supra note 140, at 873, 879–80.
144. Id. at 873.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Gillat, supra note 43, at 716–17.
150. See id.
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In a pharmaceutical context, generic small molecule drugs
and interchangeable biosimilars represent products with the
greatest market significance. These products are direct competitors because they can be substituted for the respective refer151
ence product without prescriber intervention. In fact, some
states require that pharmacists substitute a generic for the
brand drug unless the prescriber specifically requests the lat152
ter. Distinct drugs in the same therapeutic class also generally have high market significance as they “compete for essentially the same population of patients” and may be “virtually
153
indistinguishable” with respect to safety and effectiveness.
This category likely includes biosimilars that do not meet the
154
criteria for interchangeability. Still, these products have a
155
lesser effect on profits than direct substitutes. Drugs from
different classes used to treat the same condition may also have
some market significance, but the level of competition between
such products is often minimized by important differences in
156
effectiveness or side effects. This same logic suggests that absent extenuating circumstances, the market significance of individual drugs used to treat different diseases is minimal.
Notably, because of its relationship with competition, market significance also corresponds with the degree of consumer

151. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3) (2006) (defining an interchangeable biologic
as a biosimilar that can be substituted “without the intervention of the
healthcare provider”); William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution
Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1384
(2010) (explaining generic substitution laws); see also supra notes 33–34 and
accompanying text.
152. Shrank et al., supra note 151.
153. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars—Drug Promotion in a
Competitive Market, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1350 (1994) (explaining the
“highly competitive marketplace” among drugs in discrete therapeutic classes).
154. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits—
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009) (“If
biosimilar products are not similarly interchangeable with the original biologic
product, they could not be substituted for the original and would have to be
marketed to physicians as therapeutic alternatives. . . . The market for [these]
biosimilar products is likely to resemble that for new members of a chemical
class that already has established therapeutic value.”).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Atholl Johnston et al., Effectiveness, Safety and Cost of Drug
Substitution in Hypertension, 70 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 320, 322–
23 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2949902/
pdf/bcp0070-0320.pdf (explaining that although switching between two different classes of blood pressure medications is common, differences in safety, effectiveness, and drug interactions impact the desirability of the interchange).
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cost savings realized by the introduction of another product.
Direct substitutes, with their highest market significance, also
158
produce the greatest price decreases. The addition of distinct
competitors in the same (or another) therapeutic class, however, does not necessarily result in significantly lower prices because usurping sales from the established drug requires pre159
scriber intervention. In fact, companies can sometimes charge
160
more for a new drug, even in an already-crowded class. And
“entirely new classes of compounds to treat a disease or condi161
tion are often priced at a premium relative to older classes.”
b. Predictability
A second factor affecting the incentive to innovate is the
162
foreseeability of lost or diminished exclusivity. A key variable
of this factor is whether the exception is applied to existing
163
technology or future developments. When an unpredictable
reduction in exclusivity is granted on existing technology, it
may be too late to make any significant strategy alterations,
164
minimizing the impact on innovation. If a company is able to
predict that a certain project will be subject to lessened patent
protection, however, it can prospectively alter its course of ac165
tion related to the technology. Adjustments may include re166
ducing investment in the project or abandoning it altogether.
157. See, e.g., Engelberg et al., supra note 154, at 1918 (contrasting the
market for drugs in the same therapeutic class “from that for small-molecule
generics, in which interchangeability creates intense price competition that
swiftly reduces the market share of the expensive branded product”).
158. Id.
159. Kessler et al., supra note 153 (“Traditional economics might suggest . . . that a late entry would have to be priced below its competitors to win
a market share. Sometimes this is the case. However, companies also rely on
the widely held notion—not always true—that what is newer is better and is
therefore worth more.”).
160. Id. (“Aggressive advertising campaigns and lack of information among
prescribing physicians about comparative costs can facilitate the higher pricing of ‘me too’ drugs.”).
161. JOSEPH A. DIMASI, PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION: PHARMACEUTICALS: 1995–1999 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drug
-papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm.
162. Chien, supra note 140, at 873.
163. See id. (“Unpredictable licenses that cover only existing technologies
are more limited in scope than those that are predictable and cover future inventions.”).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 873–74.
166. Id. at 874.
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Thus, even academics who downplay diminished exclusivity’s
potential to stifle innovation recognize that such an effect is
167
more likely under a system that applies exceptions liberally.
As previously discussed, since its enactment the safe harbor’s protections have been applied with growing frequency to
168
an increasing number of settings. This trend toward a broad
interpretation increases the chance that a particular pharmaceutical development will be subject to lost exclusivity under
the safe harbor. Although each new widening of the safe harbor
may come too late to affect existing R&D, pharmaceutical companies have the ability to tailor future developments to avoid
circumstances where the courts have interpreted § 271(e)(1) to
apply broadly.
c. Availability of Alternative Means for Recouping Costs
Taken together, the first two factors demonstrate that a liability exemption combining high market significance and
great predictability can result in a significant disincentive to
169
innovate. Nonetheless, even an adverse impact on innovation
caused by high market significance and predictability may be
mitigated by alternative means for recouping return on in170
vestment. Trade secrecy is the most comparable alternative
to patenting for protecting the value of an invention that would
171
otherwise have limited or no patent protection. Such an approach, however, can decrease overall social welfare by reduc172
ing the amount of information publicly available. An entity
173
may alternatively increase revenues by raising prices. But in
a truly competitive market, this is generally not a viable option
167. See, e.g., Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1292; see also Gillat, supra
note 43, at 717 (“A compulsory license that is relatively easy to obtain and that
involves low royalties set by someone other than the patentee has a potential
negative effect on the incentives for innovation.”).
168. See supra Part I.D.
169. Chien, supra note 140, at 879–80.
170. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents:
An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295,
304 (1994) (exploring the various options available to companies faced with
lost patent exclusivity).
171. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723.
172. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d
1348, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining the information
disclosure problems associated with keeping inventions secret), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
173. Fisch, supra note 170, at 305.
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as sales will simply shift to the cheaper alternative. A third
175
option is to decrease expenditures. Unfortunately, limited expenditures can raise serious questions about resource alloca176
tion affecting R&D.
On the whole, the pharmaceutical industry is foreclosed
from many of the alternative means for recouping investment
costs. The extreme disclosure requirements associated with
177
FDA approval make trade secret protection unfeasible. As far
as raising revenues, a competitive market with generic en178
trants forecloses the option of increased prices. A company
operating in a truly competitive market also likely would be as
ill-advised in cutting advertising expenditures as in raising
prices—either option is apt to result in a loss of market
179
share. The bulk of a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s remain180
ing expenditures consist of R&D. As a result, a manufacturer
needing to compensate for the lost value of patent exclusivity
181
without raising prices would be most inclined to reduce risk.
This could mean limiting research to more reliable, less182
cutting-edge developments or cutting R&D expenditures al183
together, either of which foreshadows a corresponding de184
crease in innovation.
174. Id. at 306–07 (“Price theory teaches that in a competitive marketplace, a seller will not profit from a unilateral price increase because purchasers will select a less expensive substitute.”).
175. Id. at 308.
176. See id. at 308–13.
177. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723 (“The most obvious alternative protection—trade secrecy—is not an option for the pharmaceutical industry because
detailed disclosure is required for purposes of approval of the drug, and then
for marketing. This is amplified by patent law rules and the industry’s tendency to patent its compounds and processes at an early stage of research . . . .”).
178. Fisch, supra note 170, at 307 (“[P]harmaceutical companies cannot
expect to create a healthy balance sheet by increasing prices on pharmaceuticals in a competitive marketplace.”).
179. Id. at 306–11.
180. Id. at 308–13.
181. See id. at 311–12.
182. Id. at 312 (“A pharmaceutical company seeking to reduce risk by diversifying into less risky . . . research and development will likely seek out activities in which it already possesses existing expertise. . . . In such a scenario,
pharmaceutical research and development is curtailed to achieve the reduced
risk via diversification.”).
183. Id. (“[A] pharmaceutical company may attempt to achieve a healthy
balance sheet by reducing expenditures on research, development, and testing.”).
184. See id. at 312–13 (“The result of reducing risks by not developing
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Importantly, an aversion to risk is likely to disproportionately affect the developing field of biologics and biosimilars. Not
only are the development costs higher, but much of the technol185
ogy is still theoretical and success is uncertain. Without the
promise of exclusive commercial exploitation and the potential
windfall of a successful product, many companies will expectedly shy away from biosimilars altogether in favor of less risky
186
investments. A shift in resources will temper the current
momentum toward finding breakthrough biologic treatments
for otherwise untreatable diseases, decreasing the public’s
187
overall access to effective healthcare. In sum, the lack of
practical alternatives for recovering costs means the imposition
of a highly significant, highly predictable system denying patent exclusivity in the field of pharmaceuticals would make a
reduction in innovation almost inevitable.
B. THE SAFE HARBOR’S IMPACT ON INNOVATION
As just demonstrated, the balance between the benefits
and costs of a liability exception is strongly weighted in favor of
the benefits when the impact on the patentee’s market is minimal. Not only does protecting the market curtail the patentee’s
specific costs, but it diminishes the risk of a negative impact on
innovation, maximizing overall social welfare and information
production. Pre-Momenta, the combination of two factors kept
the safe harbor’s market impact in check: (1) the restriction of
the safe harbor to pre-approval activities; and (2) the historical
dominance of small molecule drugs. Post-Momenta, these factors no longer function to adequately curb market harm to the
patentee.
1. Pre-Momenta Safeguards
The first factor traditionally limiting the safe harbor’s
pharmaceuticals that might be [subject to lost exclusivity] is the same as reducing risks through diversification—a decrease in the creation of breakthrough pharmaceuticals. . . . Studies [also] indicate that the level of spending
on research, development, and testing directly corresponds with the creation of
new pharmaceuticals. . . . Accordingly, reducing research, development, and
testing expenditures would most likely result in the reduction, and possibly
the elimination, of the creation of breakthrough pharmaceuticals.”); see also
SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33, at 3.
185. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 4–5.
186. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note
33, at 13.
187. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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market impact was the lack of jurisprudence extending safe
188
harbor protection after FDA approval. Restricting the safe
harbor to pre-approval activities shields pharmaceutical patent
holders from market harm by excluding essentially all commer189
cially significant activities from protection. Because a drug
cannot be sold until approved, pre-approval infringement does
not result in significant commercial competition for the patent
190
holder; continued unauthorized use after approval to commercialize a product would expose the unauthorized user to in191
Competitors faced with such a prefringement liability.
approval restriction must therefore refrain from unauthorized
sales of an infringing product until the relevant patents expire
192
or risk an infringement suit. Either way, the patent holder’s
commercial exclusivity expectations are preserved during the
life of the patent.
Even absent an explicit restriction limiting the safe harbor’s scope to pre-approval activities, the established dominance of small molecule drugs has been a second factor limiting
market harm. Specifically, the relatively straightforward nature of small molecule drug development creates a de facto bar193
rier to post-approval commercial competition. Because “small
molecule drugs . . . can [generally] be synthesized relatively
194
easily and characterized readily with laboratory techniques,”
188. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 1, at 45 (“This section
does not permit the commercial sale of a patented drug by the party using the
drug to develop such information . . . .”); id. pt. 2, at 30 (noting that the interference from the limited testing of a drug for approval purposes is “de
minimus”). But see id. pt. 1, at 45 (“[I]t does permit the commercial sale of research quantities of active ingredients to such party.”).
190. See Hearing, supra note 73, at 926 (memorandum of Alfred B.
Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association)
(“[T]he limited testing activity required to obtain FDA approval of a generic
drug would not normally result in the use of even a single generic tablet for its
therapeutic purpose during the life of a valid patent.”).
191. Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 2, at 30 (“[T]he generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the patent . . . .”).
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
193. See Woodage, supra note 93, ¶ 11 (“Because small-molecule drugs . . .
have simple chemical structures, it is relatively easy to establish chemical
identity between a generic competitor and its corresponding reference product.”).
194. Therapeutic Research Center, Approval of Generic Enoxaparin
(Lovenox), PHARMACIST’S LETTER/PRESCRIBER’S LETTER, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1,
available at http://pharmacytechniciansletter.therapeuticresearch.com/pl/
detaildocuments/260902.pdf?cs=&s=PTL.
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protection for small-molecules is focused on patents claiming
either the product itself or a method of using the product to
195
treat a particular condition. Prior to approval, unauthorized
use of these patented compounds or methods has value related
196
to information production but cannot result in drug sales. After approval, however, the value of the compound or treatment
197
method is generally associated with commercial sales. This
198
commercial consumption lacks a nexus to FDA requirements.
Without that nexus, most post-approval unauthorized uses fall
outside the safe harbor’s statutory language specifying the use
be related to submitting information required by law.
2. Post-Momenta Considerations
Unfortunately, evolution of the safe harbor and the pharmaceutical industry has eroded the effectiveness of these implicit safeguards, leaving the safe harbor in need of reform for
the twenty-first century. Still, neither strictly limiting the safe
harbor to pre-approval activities (Classen) nor unrestrictedly
expanding it post-approval (Momenta) adequately balances innovation and access in a complex-molecule drug market. The
Momenta decision itself highlights the significant shortcomings
of such a bright-line distinction.
a. The Reduced Benefits of a Pre-Approval Limitation
Hatch-Waxman’s expedited market entry for generic competitors upon expiration of the brand patents does not always
work as intended when it comes to complex small molecule
drugs and biosimilars. For traditional small molecules, a chem195. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (requiring applicants to only list patents claiming the drug or its method of use, not patents on manufacturing
methods); Woodage, supra note 93, ¶ 5 (“[C]onsideration of manufacturing
methods will play an important role . . . in patent litigation between . . . biologic manufacturers in ways that they have not in the small-molecule drug context.”).
196. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Michael Vella et al., Behind the Footnote in Merck KGaA v.
Integra, PHARMACEUTICAL L. INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://
www.mofo.com/files/Publication/e729ab19-a8f6-42fd-a4b6-2dda18b5ce8c/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3c993a04-f119-4a58-b276-dede5a9cd846/
0510Merck.pdf (“[P]atented drug products[’] . . . value primarily resides in
commercial sales to the general public after FDA approval . . . .”).
198. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Nos. 09 Civ. 10112(KBF),
10 Civ. 7246(KBF), 2013 WL 3732867, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2013) (emphasizing that selling a patented invention to others is not a use protected under
the safe harbor and likening such commercialization to “a square peg in a
round hole”).
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ical compound that comes off patent generally can be copied
and its identity verified through basic, publicly available, ana199
lytical chemistry techniques. But with more complex molecules, small differences in manufacturing can significantly affect the end product and cause its molecular composition to
200
vary. This potential for variation creates challenges for showing bioequivalence of small molecule drugs or establishing that
201
a biosimilar is “highly similar” to its reference product. Satisfying these standards may often require developing novel analytical techniques to verify the identity of each commercial
202
batch of drug marketed after FDA approval. While developing such techniques could create significant barriers to generic
entry, those techniques may also be eligible for patent protection and reward those entities investing in their development
203
with a period of exclusivity.
The fact that the Momenta dispute was between two generic manufacturers punctuates this new reality. Momenta sought
to exclude other generic competitors on the basis of a patent
wholly separate from any patents on the actual drug product,
204
which had already entered the public domain. Furthermore,
the litigated patent related to a method endorsed, although not
specifically required, by the FDA for producing the identity da199. See, e.g., SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 74, at
2–3 (“Typical pharmaceutical products consist of small molecules . . . that may
be readily characterized and reproduced through well-understood chemical
processes.”); see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
200. Huub Schellekens, Biosimilar Therapeutics–What Do We Need to Consider?, 2 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION PLUS i27, i28 (2009),
available at http://ckj.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/suppl_1/i27.full.pdf+html
(“Small changes in, or differences between, manufacturing processes may have
a significant impact on the quality, purity, biological characteristics and clinical activity of the final product.”).
201. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d
1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013); Lisa S.
Rotenstein et al., Opportunities and Challenges for Biosimilars: What’s on the
Horizon in the Global Insulin Market?, 30 CLINICAL DIABETES 138, 139 (2012),
available at http://clinical.diabetesjournals.org/content/30/4/138.full.pdf+html.
202. Ewa M. Davison & David K. Tellekson, Murky Waters: Post-Approval
Regulatory Activities and the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor, INTELL. PROP. BULL.
(Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain View, Cal.), Winter 2013, at 3, 5, available at
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Intellectual-Property-Bulletin
-Winter-2013.pdf (“Such manufacturers may . . . seek patent protection for the
analytical and quality control methods that they often must develop to satisfy
FDA regulations requiring a demonstration that the biosimilar ‘is highly similar to the reference product.’”); see also Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1348.
203. See Davison & Tellekson, supra note 202, at 5.
204. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1349–52.
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ta necessary to maintain approval of any generic version of the
205
drug. The additional hurdle created by the extra identity requirements gave Momenta an edge over other generic rivals
206
and slowed the proliferation of generic competition.
But it is exactly this competition created by multiple gener207
ic entrants that produces meaningful reductions in price. A
system imposing additional patent-based barriers to market
entry after the brand patents expire hinders subsequent entrants and encumbers realization of the social benefits associ208
ated with generic competition. Thus a public-benefit rationale
exists for limiting the right to exclude associated with these
added patent barriers, similar to the justifications supporting
209
the safe harbor’s original enactment. In fact, the significantly
higher prices associated with complex pharmaceuticals like biologics mean the positive externalities associated with competi210
tion are particularly acute. At the same time, categorically
limiting the safe harbor to pre-approval uses could allow patent
protection on required post-approval manufacturing and quality control methods to completely freeze competitors out of the
211
market. A pre-approval liability exception alone is therefore
insufficient to achieve the safe harbor’s intended public benefits
of reduced prices and increased access in a world of biologics
and complex small molecule drugs.
b. The Increased Costs of a Post-Approval Application
An unqualified extension of safe harbor protection to all
post-approval activities, however, also does not adequately balance innovation and access. This approach—the approach essentially endorsed in Momenta—would produce individual and
205. See id. at 1351–53.
206. Id. at 1351.
207. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 n.4
(“[R]esearch has shown that generic drug prices decrease relative to the number of generic manufacturers that enter the market.”).
208. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing the patentbased barrier to entry ratified in Roche).
209. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590 (highlighting Congress’s concern with escalating drug prices and its desire to remove barriers to
competition to control costs).
210. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 (presenting both the high costs of
biologics and the estimated cost savings from biosimilars); see also supra notes
35–37, 40 and accompanying text.
211. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (expressing concern for the situation
“where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from the market
based on an FDA mandated testing requirement”).
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social costs arguably outweighing the benefits associated with
increased biologic competition. Again, the explanation rests in
the importance of manufacturing method patents to complex
212
drugs. These patents implicate commercial activities that occur after FDA approval in a manner dissimilar to product patents. Unlike a patented product, whose value derives primarily from post-approval commercial consumption that is
213
unequivocally excluded from safe harbor protection, a method
patent has independent commercial value when used to pro214
duce a sellable product. This commercial production intrinsically implicates post-approval activities. Momenta demonstrates that if the method generates FDA-required
215
information—which it arguably often will —extending
§ 271(e)(1) to cover post-approval uses could shield infringers
216
from liability for the entire useful lifespan of the patent.
Permitting rivals to freely exploit the patented method allows them to capitalize on the method’s commercially beneficial
uses and produce a competing product without incurring any of
217
the costs associated with developing the method. This essentially creates a free-rider situation and imposes significant in218
dividual market harm on the patentee. Because market harm
correlates with the ease of substitution, the greatest risk for
market harm with biologics stems from directly substitutable
219
interchangeable biologics and closely competing biosimilars —
220
the exact products the BPCIA was designed to foster. This
explains why the developing biosimilar market is particularly
affected by post-approval application of the safe harbor.
The potential for market harm is compounded by the safe
harbor’s design, which forecloses several options a patent owner generally has when its exclusive rights are threatened. First,
212. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
214. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351.
215. See id. at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that the interpretation
of “submission” to include record retention for inspection purposes “would allow almost all activity by pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’
and therefore justify a free license to trespass” (emphasis added)).
216. Id. at 1366 (“[T]his court rewrites the law to allow Amphastar to infringe Momenta’s patent throughout the entire life of Momenta’s patent and for
the purpose of obtaining profits on commercial sales of a product that competes
with the patentee.”).
217. See id. at 1362.
218. See id.
219. See supra notes 146, 151–54 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
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the statute fails to secure a royalty or alternative remuneration
221
for the patentee to offset a decrease in market share. Second,
the safe harbor actually creates a disincentive to license the patented technology. Not only does § 271(e)(1) not require any
222
sort of dialogue between the parties, but the lack of remuner223
ation hinders potential licensing agreements. While a patent
owner faced with the safe harbor may be more inclined to negotiate, the competitor’s incentive is reduced—the possibility of
free, unrestricted use of the patent is apt to outweigh the terms
224
of most potential licensing agreements. Even the threat of litigation loses its luster as a bargaining tool under the safe harbor, as the wide array of information mandated by the FDA and
the significant judicial expansion of the safe harbor’s scope
have greatly increased the likely umbrella of protection for
225
would-be infringers.
Absent remuneration or a license, the primary benefit retained by a patent holder faced with competition from an infringer excused under the safe harbor is whatever market posi226
tion it was able to secure prior to the competitors’ entrance.
But while the BPCIA grants a pioneer biologic a substantial
227
twelve years of regulatory exclusivity, the first interchangeable approved only receives a median period of exclusivity of
228
eighteen months. There is no exclusivity granted for subse229
quent interchangeable products or biosimilars. These exclu221. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Momenta, 686
F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
223. Cf. Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303 (explaining that the threat of remuneration for excused infringement “provide[s] a strong incentive for parties
to negotiate among themselves to reach an agreement”).
224. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 1367; supra note 215.
226. See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2158 (2011) (associating early entry and exclusivity with
price discrimination that can lead to “substantial revenues and profits,” as
well as the “‘first mover’ advantage, meaning that even when price is matched,
the first [entrant] may be likely to capture a higher share of the market”).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2006).
228. See id. § 262(k)(6) (providing a range of exclusivity from twelve to forty-two months depending on the litigation status of the interchangeable application at the time of the subsequent filing, with eighteen months of exclusivity
granted for applications unencumbered by litigation).
229. See id.; Ronald A. Rader, An Analysis of the US Biosimilars Development Pipeline and Likely Market Evolution, BIOPROCESS INT’L, June 2013, at
16, 20, available at http://www.bioprocessintl.com/multimedia/archive/00219/
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sivity periods remain unchanged even if the follow-on manufacturer invests substantial time and resources developing methods to satisfy the FDA’s criteria for demonstrating “same230
ness.” After Momenta, the safe harbor permits later entrants
to use those same methods to produce interchangeable or easily
substitutable products without consideration for the timing of
the innovator’s market entry or the opportunity for exclusive
231
market occupation. Thus the safe harbor makes it likely two
manufacturers will be similarly situated in the market despite
only one of them having invested the resources to produce the
necessary technology. The result is little to no advantage—
patent or otherwise—bestowed on these forerunners of followon biologic development.
Nowhere is the potential for extreme devaluation of these
types of process patents by an unrestrained safe harbor more
obvious than in the Momenta decision itself. As Judge Rader
noted in his dissent, the unchecked application of the safe harbor to post-approval uses of process patents removes the patent
owner’s right to exclude during any part of the patent life and
“essentially render[s] manufacturing method patents worth232
less.” He concluded by emphasizing the inequities of such a
system that “abrogates [an entity’s] hard-achieved property
233
right and reallocates that entitlement to its competitors.”
Momenta also foreshadows the corresponding decrease in
innovation likely to accompany this extreme devaluation of
manufacturing method patents. Because Amphastar manufactured an exact substitute for Momenta’s enoxaparin product,
the court excused otherwise infringing activities with the high234
est market significance for the patentee. The court’s liberal
BPI_A_131106SUPAR02_219312a.pdf (“[B]iosimilars get no reward for being
first to market. In fact, the first companies to file will probably bear the brunt
of resolving patent disputes, which could cost tens of millions of dollars, allowing products filed/approved later to avoid much of that trouble. The first to file
also will probably have to face more regulatory hurdles.”).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6); Rader, supra note 229, at 20.
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
232. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
233. Id. at 1376 (further characterizing the development as “a sad day for
property owners and an undeserved victory for those who decline to invest in
the expense and difficulty of discovery and invention”).
234. See id. at 1351 (majority opinion) (“The approval of Amphastar’s version of enoxaparin, and the resultant ruinous competition of another generic
version of the drug, threatened [Momenta’s] unique market position.”); supra

Wessels_MLR

1598

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1565

interpretation of § 271(e)(1)’s liability exception also makes its
applicability to similar analytical methods for demonstrating
“sameness” not only predictable, but almost a foregone conclu235
sion. Together those factors create the perfect storm to deter
would-be innovators considering investing the significant time
and resources needed to bring a biosimilar or generic complex
236
small molecule drug to market. They also discourage later
entrants from innovating better methods for meeting the FDA’s
237
similarity requirements. Ultimately, Momenta makes clear
that unchecked application of the safe harbor to post-approval
activities fails to adequately uphold the safe harbor’s objective
of preserving innovation.
III. A NEW SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK POSTMOMENTA
The time has come to take the safe harbor in a new direction. This Part reasons that § 271(e)(1)’s impact on market significance must be readjusted to preserve an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of the safe harbor in today’s
changing pharmaceutical landscape. While some desirable improvements to the safe harbor are specific to biologics, other
ways to enhance the overall equity of the doctrine apply indiscriminately to all pharmaceuticals. Regardless, change is required to increase the chance that the BPCIA’s abbreviated approval pathway will produce a meaningful follow-on biologic
market that balances innovation and access.
The complexities of the problem suggest a three-step approach. First, the BPCIA’s patent litigation procedures should
include enhanced notification provisions that better reflect the
types of patent protection associated with biologic development.
Second, the FDA should delay market entry for all entities relying on safe harbor protection as a shield from infringement liability for activities related to the commercial manufacture, use,
notes 144–46, 151–52 and accompanying text.
235. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting); supra note 167
and accompanying text.
236. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (comparing the
court’s outcome to “a teacher who rewards the top student by allowing her
peers to copy her exam answers” to explain how the decision “does violence to
patent law and future research incentives in this field”).
237. See, e.g., id. at 1369 (“Amphastar is free to invent its own method to
satisfy these requirements. Instead it chooses to trespass.”); id. at 1370 (“[If]
this court would permit copiers to infringe[, w]hat incentive remains to invest
in inventing a better test?”).
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or sale of a product that has obtained federal regulatory approval. This step specifically includes extending the BPCIA’s
exclusivity provisions for interchangeable products to all followon biologics. Finally, patent owners should receive a reasonable
royalty for all safe harbor uses of their respective patents. By
reducing the market harm to patentees, the combination of
these compensation mechanisms should minimize potential
barriers to innovation.
A. LITIGATION FRAMEWORK
A key component of the abbreviated approval pathways
under both Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA is that they provide
238
mechanisms for identifying and resolving patent disputes.
These dispute resolution procedures work to facilitate equitable
competition by resolving patent challenges posed by subsequent
239
competitors before the competing product is approved. This
prevents market entry from being delayed by unproductive liti240
gation while identifying valid patent barriers to competition.
It is during this dispute resolution process that a biologic manufacturer accused of infringement might invoke safe harbor
protection in defense of its activities.
The existing BPCIA provisions, however, are inadequate to
fully embrace effective patent dispute resolution because they
only address conflicts between the sponsors of reference prod241
But as exuct applications and follow-on manufacturers.
plained above, potential patent disputes in the biologic realm
are not confined between reference product sponsors and manu242
facturers of follow-on products. Disputes can just as easily
243
arise between two follow-on manufacturers. Although nothing prevents approved follow-on applicants from relying on tra244
ditional channels to uncover potential infringement, the absence of any notice mechanism increases the chance that
238. See supra notes 66, 92 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.
240. See, e.g., Ashlee B. Mehl, Note, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market
Exclusivity for Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649, 650 (2006).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2006).
242. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.
243. Cf. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (deciding a suit between generic manufacturers of a
complex small molecule drug), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
244. Cf. id. at 1349–52 (resulting in patent infringement litigation despite
the absence of notification procedures covering the patent-in-suit).

Wessels_MLR

1600

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1565

potentially infringing activities will not be discovered until well
after the competing product is commercialized. Thus, in order
to fully embrace the equities of the proposed solution, the biologic dispute resolution procedures should also facilitate the
identification and resolution of patent conflicts between these
stakeholders. Such provisions would decrease the chance of unknown infringement of patented manufacturing methods, bolstering confidence in the value of the invention.
Helpfully, the BPCIA already incorporates a framework for
notifying the reference product sponsor of all patents—
including manufacturing and quality control method patents—
245
potentially infringed by a follow-on applicant. The BPCIA
should be amended to further require that subsequent followon applicants give similar notice to all previously approved
manufacturers of the particular product for which they are
seeking approval. Although a complete assessment of the intricacies of the BPCIA is beyond the scope of this Note, an effective amendment could theoretically be as simple as adding the
language “or previously approved subsection (k) applicant(s)”
wherever the term “reference product sponsor” appears in 42
246
U.S.C. § 262(l).
Of course, increased disclosure raises concerns about confidentiality for manufacturing systems and other proprietary information. As an initial safeguard, the BPCIA protects the dissemination of confidential data by limiting the permitted
247
recipients of such information. The proposed amendment includes a further safeguard by only requiring notice be given to
previously approved follow-on applicants. This limitation recognizes the increased risk for improper appropriation of information by entities competing for approval as those entities are
actively engaged in modifying their applications. Further, because the FDA could ultimately deny both applications, the potential controversy between two unapproved applicants is not
ripe. If one manufacturer’s follow-on application is ultimately
granted, that manufacturer could activate the disclosure requirements by following procedures similar to those laid out in

245. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) refers to an applicant for a follow-on product as a
“subsection (k) applicant” in reference to § 262(k), the subsection governing
the “licensure of biological products as biosimilar or interchangeable.” See id.
§ 262(k); id. § 262(l).
247. Id. § 262(l)(1).
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248

the BPCIA for newly acquired patents.
Notably, the proposed amendment does not address the potential for conflict between two biologic reference product applicants. It also does not provide for notification of potential infringement pertaining to “method of making” patents under
Hatch-Waxman. But in response to this first potential concern,
a biologic approved as a reference product and not as a followon product cannot be directly substituted for another product
without prescriber intervention, lessening the threat of direct
249
market competition between two reference products. As for
the second concern, history demonstrates that the importance
of manufacturing method patents is the exception and not the
250
norm in the context of Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA provisions.
And as Momenta demonstrates, traditional methods for discovering infringement still exist for those infrequent instances involving the few complex small molecule drugs where manufac251
turing method patents might play a role.
B. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY

252

A second way to restore equity to the safe harbor is to
counteract a liability exception granted for activities related to
the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of an FDA-regulated
product with a period of market exclusivity for the patent holder. Thus, when the safe harbor protects these commercial activities, the FDA should be required to stay approval of the otherwise-infringing entity’s application. If the competing
application is already approved, the FDA should suspend it.
Similar to the BPCIA’s current provisions granting exclusivity
to the first interchangeable biologic, the period of exclusivity
should depend on the approval and litigation status of the pa248. See id. § 262(l)(7) (requiring notice of all potentially infringed patents
within thirty days of the newly acquired right).
249. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text (explaining how manufacturing method patents have not been important for small molecule drugs
under Hatch-Waxman).
251. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
252. Although referred to as market exclusivity for convenience, the proposal embodied in this section envisions scenarios where the recipient of the
“exclusivity” term is not in fact the exclusive market player (or even the exclusive generic or biosimilar manufacturer). Nonetheless, delayed approval of
competitors creates some form of exclusivity for the recipient as compared to
those later market entrants.
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253

tent holder’s application. In this vein, a system mimicking
these highly scrutinized exclusivity periods in the BPCIA might
be sufficient—providing exclusivity for twelve months after the
first commercial marketing of the patentee’s product, eighteen
months if the product has yet to be commercialized but is unencumbered by litigation, or forty-two months if litigation is ongo254
ing.
Set exclusivity periods may not be workable in all conflict
permutations, however. Because of the potential for crosslitigation in a field with multiple follow-on entrants, a defined
period of exclusivity obtained in litigation with one competitor
may expire while locked in litigation with another. Accordingly,
a period based on independent expert review that accompanies
a safe harbor determination may be more desirable. Nonetheless, even with defined exclusivity periods the proposed solution provides benefits over the status quo by preventing a freerider from usurping market share from the patentee. Although
exclusivity periods already exist for brand-name small molecule
255
256
drugs, biologic reference products, the first generic ANDA
257
258
filer, and the first interchangeable biologic, this proposal
would further promote innovation and market entrance by subsequent interchangeable biologics, biosimilars, and complex
259
small drug manufacturers. Moreover, entities wanting to circumvent an imposed period of exclusivity may be incentivized
to innovate alternatives to patented methods for satisfying
260
FDA requirements.
This prong of the solution eases the burden of the safe harbor on the primary benefit conferred upon a patent holder—the
right to exclude. As noted above, elimination of this right under
the safe harbor can either be temporary or persist for the entire
261
life of the patent. Delaying market entry of competitors benefiting from a liability exception granted under the safe harbor
reintroduces the concept of exclusivity.
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
254. Id.
255. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2006).
257. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
259. See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text (explaining how these
entities are most likely to be affected by commercially significant applications
of post-approval safe harbor protection).
260. Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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Market exclusivity is a common incentive in the world of
pharmaceuticals and FDA regulation, and its frequent use
262
For tradihighlights its commercially significant benefits.
tional small molecule pharmaceuticals, early market entrance
263
is a strong predictor of success and profits. Market exclusivity is expected to have an even stronger correlation with success
or failure in the field of follow-on biologics, and the availability
(or lack thereof) of market exclusivity may determine whether
or not the abbreviated pathway for follow-on biologics takes
264
hold. Since direct competition from less expensive substitutes
lowers drug costs, success of the abbreviated pathway for biologics is key to reducing health care costs in this expanding
265
field.
Importantly, the proposed solution does not limit this remedy to follow-on biologics, much less interchangeable biologics
or even BPCIA-regulated products. Momenta demonstrates
that the safe harbor indiscriminately imposes its inequities and
can have significant commercial implications for certain small
266
molecule drugs. In response, indiscriminate market exclusivity for all commercial applications of the safe harbor is desirable. As the class of pharmaceuticals most likely to be impacted
by commercial applications of the safe harbor, however, followon biologics can be expected to benefit most from this remedy.
C. REASONABLE ROYALTY
Finally, the imposition of a reasonable royalty for all safe
harbor uses would reduce the inequities caused by § 271(e)(1)’s
invariable creation of “free-riders” that receive the benefits of
innovation without incurring any of the costs. To be effective, a
royalty must be high enough to ensure the patentee realizes
some profits but low enough to allow for price competition by
262. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation, 19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855 (2010).
263. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics,
87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 39 (2005) (“If a [generic pharmaceutical] firm obtains early approval, it is likely to earn a positive return on its applicationrelated costs, whereas firms obtaining approval later in the process are likely
not to recover their sunk costs.”).
264. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note
33.
265. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
266. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
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267

the excused infringer. Imposing a royalty in this “sweet spot”
should preserve incentives to innovate while still creating
268
meaningful reductions in drug price. Importantly, the existence of the royalty alone may actually reduce safe harbor lawsuits by encouraging parties to negotiate a license and forgo lit269
And in situations where negotiations are
igation.
unsuccessful or impractical, courts can readily impose the royalty alongside a judicial determination that the safe harbor ap270
plies.
With the importance of setting an effective royalty rate in
mind, opponents of reasonable royalties often lament the diffi271
culty of determining their value. Specifically, it can be problematic to determine the infringed patent’s value to both the
272
patent owner and the infringer. This is particularly challenging in a context of a liability exception permitting ongoing behavior because the royalty applies not only to past infringement but also to any future infringement that occurs while the
273
exception endures. Because the protection granted by the safe
harbor has the potential to last the entire duration of the patent, adequately predicting the future value of the patent is especially important for preserving the incentive to innovate.
This difficulty alone, however, is no justification for embracing an inequitable and detrimental status quo that provides no compensation. Moreover, valuation of reasonable roy274
For example, judicial
alties is a common occurrence.
determinations of non-injunctive relief in antitrust and patent
infringement suits provide precedent for setting royalty
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303.
See id.
Id. at 1298, 1303.
See id.
Id. at 1298.
Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH &
RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2014).
273. See Neal E. Solomon, What Is a Reasonable Royalty? A Comparative
Assessment of Patent Damages Methodologies 3 (June 11, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1623982 (arguing that reasonable royalties tend to “undervalue patents by an
ex post facto view of future and unknowable markets”).
274. Richard F. Cauley, Defunding the Trolls: Attacking the Damages
Claim, IP LAW 360 (Portfolio Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 14, 2008, at 1,
available at http://www.whglawfirm.com/CM/Articles/Defunding%20the%
20Trolls.pdf (“The most common award for patent infringement . . . is a ‘reasonable royalty’ . . . .”).
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275

rates. In this context, experts can often assist in valuing the
276
patent.
Indeed, federal regulation makes the pharmaceutical in277
dustry well-suited to expert valuation of royalties. Because
the date of entry of the generic can be determined in advance,
“the size of the potential revenue in each market can be pro278
jected with some accuracy.” A reasonable royalty based on
market potential can then be calculated by extrapolating that
279
data based on the number of entrants at any given time.
The possibility that some stakeholders will no longer be
able to afford to innovate if required to pay for the technology is
another primary justification for excluding royalties from the
280
safe harbor. The concern is that research and development
often implicates several patents held by multiple companies
and that a need to pay each company to use the relevant patents may outweigh the value of any potential end-product of
281
the research. This argument is amplified in contexts where
the research is targeted at developing an intermediary product
or research tool that has little or no commercial value in and of
282
itself. In those situations, an inventor faced with one or more

275. Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303; see, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86
F.3d 1098, 1109–10 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the calculation of reasonable
royalties); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen factors
courts may consider in determining a reasonable royalty), modified, 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). See generally Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, supra note 272 (providing
an overview of several methodologies for assessing reasonable royalties).
276. See generally Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your Royalty?, J. ACCT., Sept. 2008, at 56 (detailing considerations for experts assisting in
calculating royalties).
277. See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 263, at 37 (“[B]ecause a market begins
when the patent on an existing drug expires, the date at which the market
opens to competitors is known in advance and the potential revenue can be
projected with some accuracy . . . .”).
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Cf. Freeburg, supra note 42, at 410 (“A common objection to compulsory licensing is that it reduces the incentive to invent . . . .”).
281. Cf. id. at 412 (“Reach-through royalties, where licenses can continue
to collect fees on downstream inventions . . . . could create a problem of royalty
stacking . . . .”).
282. Id. (“[R]oyalty stacking . . . is probably not a good suggestion unless
the end product actually contains the research tool.”).
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restrictions on the right to exclude may simply choose to aban283
don the research altogether.
This argument, however, is of decreased relevance among
pharmaceutical manufacturers as the end research goal is generally a commercial product with the potential for significant
284
market returns. Moreover, a case-by-case royalty amount, rather than a fixed rate, mitigates these concerns and allows for
adjustment of the remedy in each specific situation to better
promote the safe harbor’s goals. For one thing, individual royalty awards mean less commercially valuable or less frequently
285
used technology can be priced accordingly. And while safe
harbor protection does not turn on a lack of non-infringing alternatives, a case-by-case approach permits consideration of
available alternatives when setting the rate. Imposing a lower
royalty rate when faced with significant technological hurdles
and a single means for meeting the FDA’s standards could less286
en an otherwise high barrier to market entry. On the other
hand, a higher royalty rate could shift activities to noninfringing alternatives if they exist. At the very least, a higher
rate rewards subsequent innovators in situations of competing
287
alternatives, which may encourage even more innovation. Ultimately, it is this type of flexible system that will best balance
the costs of innovation against the costs of increasing access to
affordable medication.
CONCLUSION
While the safe harbor once operated to balance innovation
and the public interest, market changes and an increasingly
broad judicial interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have given rise to
the need to revisit its application. In effect, the Federal Cir283. Id. (describing how royalty stacking can negatively affect downstream
inventions).
284. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
285. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining that patents on research tools have not been proven to impede development because their limited commercial value corresponds with minimal compensation for patent
owner), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
286. See id. at 1360 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that an FDA
requirement for a single testing method will produce a complete barrier to
market competition). But see id. at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (supporting the
argument that a higher rate could incentivize the development of alternative
techniques for meeting requirements).
287. See id. at 1370 (discussing the importance of retaining means for incentivizing improvements).
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cuit’s endorsement of the safe harbor’s application to post-FDAapproval activities in Momenta has the potential to devalue an
entire class of key manufacturing method patents related to the
quickly developing field of biopharmaceuticals by authorizing
unchecked infringement of the patents for commercial purposes. In addition to impacting individual drug markets, the expanded scope of safe harbor protection for significant commercial activity is likely to stifle innovation in an increasingly
important field of the pharmaceutical industry, negatively impacting the overall public health and welfare.
The underlying justifications and positive practical effects
of the safe harbor can be retained, however, if the statute is
adapted to compensate entities whose patent rights are impacted. In addition to enhanced notification provisions for revealing potential infringement among follow-on manufacturers,
that compensation scheme should include both a reasonable
royalty for all safe harbor applications and a period of exclusivity for patentees faced with excused post-approval commercial
infringement of their invention. By allowing patent owners to
recoup some of their costs and develop their respective markets, the potentially lucrative return on investment driving
current levels of pharmaceutical innovation will be preserved
for years to come.

